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Possibly, it is because I was raised in a city or because 
my uncle, on whose farm I passed a few hardly idyllic 
childhood summers, was too shrewd. Whatever the 
reason, I have never been able to understand how one 
puts a cart before a horse. Shrewd as he was, Uncle 
Clarence never once even tried. I suspect, though, that I 
do understand what it means to say, "You've put the cart 
before the horse." If I do, then that is what the Congress 
has done, perhaps not for the first time. Apparently intent 
on assuring fair competition, it has already managed, 
directly and indirectly, significant deregulation of our 
commercial banks (and savings and loan associations as 
well). Until very recently, U.S. banks were limited in 
what they could pay depositors. Now, with their money 
market deposit and super NOW accounts, they are much 
freer than they were. But having managed significant 
deregulation, the Congress has yet to make a start at 
changing the U.S. deposit insurance scheme. And 
changing that scheme is what it should have done first. 
Acting in the public interest, it should have begun by 
making the scheme consistent with less-regulated banks 
and only thereafter turned to deregulation. 
In passing the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 
which it did in 1933, the Seventy-third Congress created 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It 
also imposed a pricing policy on its newly created public 
corporation. All insured banks—those with creditors 
protected against default by the FDIC—were to be 
charged alike. In other words, the FDIC was not to 
charge insured banks according to the riskiness of their 
respective balance sheets. But with an insurance pre-
mium that is constant across balance sheets, the result 
may be excessively risky banks. Indeed, unless insured 
banks are prevented by regulation from becoming riskier, 
the result is excessively risky banks. Insured banks are 
riskier than they would be if none of their creditors were 
insured. 
For any kind of company, having creditors is incen-
tive enough to become riskier. Why not gamble with the 
money of others? That is why bond covenants (restric-
tions on what those who have issued bonds may do in the 
future) are so common. But an ordinary company, one 
without government-insured creditors, provokes an ob-
vious response when it becomes riskier. Creditors de-
mand more interest either immediately or, if holding 
long-term obligations, as soon as they can. So, whether 
formally (by imposing covenants) or by their market 
response, creditors limit riskiness. 
The insured bank, though, has some creditors who, 
because they are protected by the FDIC, do not care 
what it does. In becoming riskier, it therefore does not 
provoke the response that the ordinary company does. 
Not all of the insured bank's creditors demand more 
interest. Unlike the ordinary company, it does then 
become riskier. With an insurance premium that is 
independent of its balance sheet, it does even if some of 
its creditors do care what it does. Uninsured creditors or 
depositors make a difference. But however watchful they 
may be, however ready to demand more interest, they do 
not keep the insured bank from being riskier than it would 
l be if none of its creditors were protected by the FDIC. 
Thus, the Seventy-third Congress, which long ago 
gave us the original FDIA, provided a rationale for 
regulating insured banks. Since 1933, regulation has 
been essential, if only as a substitute for enough watchful 
bank creditors. And until the FDIC's pricing policy is 
changed, or the Congress gives up on trying to protect so 
many bank depositors, it will continue to be essential. 
I do not say that over the years since 1933, bank 
regulatory policy has been near perfect or that all the 
statutes and administrative regulations that currently 
bind banks can be defended. Obviously, the FDIC's 
pricing policy does not justify the geographical restric-
tions to which banks (and bank holding companies) have 
been subject. 
Yet, it would seem inescapable that if the Congress 
and the bank regulatory agencies deregulate further 
before the Congress has changed our present-day in-
surance scheme in some appropriate way or other, they 
will be inviting a banking crisis. Of course, there may still 
be time. Even if there is more deregulation in 1983, a 
crisis soon thereafter is by no means a certainty. 
Apparently, some members of the Congress are 
willing now to at least consider a rewriting of the FDIA. 
In Title VII of the Depository Institutions (Garn-St. 
Germain) Act of 1982, the FDIC was directed, along 
with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the 
National Credit Union Administration, to provide an-
swers to questions about its insurance scheme and, more 
specifically, about the feasibility of changing that scheme 
in certain ways. What, if anything, the Congress ought to 
do with the FDIC insurance scheme is therefore at this 
moment rather a practical concern, and my purpose in 
this paper is to explore what the Congress' options or 
alternatives are. I am mostly interested in feasibility. I do 
not go far toward an ordering of those congressional 
options that, as it seems to me, are feasible. To some, 
perhaps, at least a couple of the alternatives that I 
consider will appear wildly impractical. Before the 
FDIA is amended, though, we should consider all 
manner of alternatives to the deposit insurance scheme 
of the present. 
What the alternatives are depends on why bank 
depositors or creditors are insured. In the first and 
second parts of this paper, I consider two possible 
objectives: in the first, protecting those who are both poor 
and financially naive and, in the second, preventing bank 
runs. As it happens, our present-day insurance scheme is 
consistent with neither of those objectives. But as I argue 
in the first part of the paper, there is an alternative to the 
present-day scheme, easily managed, that is consistent 
with protecting those who are poor and, in matters 
financial, quite hopeless. Moreover, under that alterna-
tive further deregulation of banks may not be terribly 
risky. And as I argue in the second part of the paper, 
there is an alternative to the present-day scheme, also 
easily managed, that is consistent with preventing bank 
runs. Under it, however, further deregulation would be 
extremely risky. 
If the objective of government-provided insurance for 
bank depositors is preventing bank runs, and we are to 
proceed with deregulation, then only a radical alternative 
to the present-day scheme will do. In the third and fourth 
parts of the paper, I consider several. Among them is the 
most oft-urged of radical alternatives, the essential 
feature of which is an insurance premium that depends 
on the risk of default. I argue, though, that we may not 
know enough to make the insurance premium depend on 
risk. So I go on to other radical alternatives. One of those 
alternatives is simply doing without government-pro-
vided insurance for bank depositors. Another, perhaps a 
little more appealing, is doing without government-
provided insurance but making banks hold 100 percent 
reserves. The last is doing without government-provided 
insurance but requiring banks to value their assets con-
tinuously at market prices. 
An Insurance Objective: 
Protecting the Naive Poor 
Why insure bank creditors? One answer to that question, 
which over the years has been given again and again, is 
that we must protect those who are poor and financially 
much too naive, who could never be expected to dis-
tinguish even the extremely risky from the riskless. 
Consider the following elegantly phrased assertion, 
made more than 150 years ago by an early advocate of 
insuring bank creditors: 
The loss by insolvency of banks generally falls upon the 
farmer, the mechanic, and the laborer, who are least 
acquainted with the condition of banks and who, of all 
others, are most illy able to either guard against or sustain a 
loss by their failure.
1 
!New York State Legislature, Assembly, Journal (Albany, New York: 
1829), p. 439.1 am indebted to Carter H. Golembe for calling the passage to my 
attention. 
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In 1829, bank notes dominated in exchange, and the 
problem was therefore to make sure that every note was 
worth its face value. Now, however, getting by with just 
notes would be too inconvenient. Instead of paying out 
notes, we mostly write checks. For all, checking ac-
counts are virtual necessities. As I understand, that is the 
essential fact (if fact it be) for those who would protect 
the poor and financially naive by having the government 
insure bank deposits. They argue that even the poor and 
financially naive are, as it were, forced to have checking 
accounts and, further, that since those folks, being 
financially naive, cannot tell good banks from bad, their 
accounts have to be protected. 
Perhaps the savings deposits of the naive poor should 
be protected too. With them in mind, one might propose 
changing the denomination of, say, the three-month 
Treasury bill from $10,000 to $50 or even $5. (If 
handling the public debt would cost more than at present, 
regulating banks would presumably cost more than 
enough less.) But would doing that help? Allegedly, all 
the financially naive know is that banks—for them, an 
undifferentiated bunch—are where they are supposed to 
put their monies. More particularly, they are incapable 
of appreciating that acquiring a $5 Treasury bill is quite 
unlike lending $5 to a terribly mismanaged bank. 
So should the government insure bank deposits to 
protect those who, besides being badly off, do poorly in 
managing their own financial affairs? How persuasive is 
the argument just summarized? Almost certainly, the 
financially naive are not now as large a proportion of the 
population as they were in 1829 or, indeed, in 1933. 
There may, however, still be many around. Even if not, 
going from relative poverty, coupled with financial 
naivete, to government protection is a leap of the heart, 
not the mind, and thus it may not matter how many there 
are. 
An Inconsistency 
If of the auto variety, a present-day mechanic may well 
appreciate a $ 100,000 FDIC insurance limit. Why have 
to deal with two or three banks? Or have two or three 
deposits? From caring for wagons to caring for autos, 
mechanics (like women) have come a long way. Possibly, 
farmers have too, although it hardly seems so at the 
moment. For our laborers, however, and the others who 
are poor and financially naive, for those who "are most 
illy able to either guard against or to sustain a loss ... 
the $100,000 limit would seem grossly excessive. 
In a recent discussion of the Penn Square Bank 
spectacular, the chair of the FDIC told of a Methodist 
congregation that had a building fund of $150,000, 
accumulated over many hard years, in the bank when it 
failed. That is sobering. Evidently, it never occurred to 
those responsible for the building fund to use two banks. 
Financial naivete cannot be entirely of the past. But no 
single instance, however heartrending, suffices to estab-
lish the proper upper limit for FDIC protection. If one 
instance did suffice, then, with enough diligence, some-
one of feeling could, I am sure, arrive at a limit of 
$1,000,000. It is necessary to use an average, and 
$100,000 would certainly seem to be way above the 
checking (and savings) deposit average of those "who, of 
all others, are most illy able ... to sustain a loss . .. ." 
Achieving Consistency 
If the purpose in having government-provided insurance 
for bank depositors is to protect those who are both 
hopelessly unsophisticated in financial matters and 
among our least affluent, then there is an easy way of 
getting an insurance scheme consistent with that pur-
pose. A proper insurance limit, one that will appear 
ridiculously low to some, does the trick. We likely will 
never know the distribution of checking (and savings) 
deposits by the degree of financial sophistication of 
owners. A distribution by income or wealth is within 
reach, though, and at a guess, since the concern is for the 
least affluent, it will yield an insurance limit of a very few 
thousand dollars, perhaps only a couple. 
With some doing, we might imagine no one ever 
wanting more on deposit in his or her bank than is 
insured. And if no one did, then there would be no 
possibility, just by lowering the limit of FDIC protec-
tion, of making regulation of banks largely or completely 
unnecessary. We can also imagine, though, and a good 
bit more easily, that for most bank creditors the limit of 
FDIC protection is not an upper bound for their deposits. 
And if a drastic change in the insurance limit, from 
$100,000 to $2,000, say, or $3,000, were to result in 
most owners of bank deposits being only partially 
insured, then we might look forward to more deregula-
tion of banks with a certain equanimity. Presumably, 
with most owners of deposits being at risk, virtually all 
banks would be subject to market discipline. Very few 
would be able, with no one noticing, to become riskier. In 
theory, of course, there is need for regulation whenever 
deposit insurance is provided by the government at a 
3 risk-independent premium. Whatever the insurance limit 
may be, there is always that need. But in practice it may 
be good enough, even for complete deregulation, to have 
an insurance limit that is truly consistent with the 
circumstances of those who supposedly are to be pro-
tected. 
When the FDIC insurance limit was increased from 
$40,000 to $ 100,000, it was partly with savings and loan 
associations in mind. In 1980, which is when the limit 
was increased, many associations were very badly off 
and, in consequence, were unable to issue large-denomi-
nation ($100,000 minimum) certificates of deposit 
(CDs). But if the insurance limit were $ 100,000, then all 
associations, even those near collapse, would be able to 
issue such certificates. The limit of the Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which in-
sures the deposits of our savings and loan associations, 
was therefore increased; and, to preserve equality, the 
FDIC's limit was increased too. 
The implication is not, however, that the insurance 
limits of the FSLIC and FDIC must remain at $ 100,000 
or, if changed, be increased further. It is rather that 
cutting limits drastically, to $2,000 or $3,000, should 
perhaps be delayed briefly. 
As most would belatedly concede, using savings and 
loan associations to subsidize housing was extremely 
poor public policy. So associations are no longer to be 
forced to lend long, in disregard of their being short-term 
borrowers; they are to have assets and liabilities of more 
nearly equal average maturities. With restrictions on 
their portfolios having been relaxed, some are even now 
working toward that end. And if not still protected by the 
FSLIC, all would be. But, again, the insurance limit of 
the FSLIC (and hence that of the FDIC) should perhaps 
be continued for a brief while at $ 100,000; insisting that 
our savings and loan associations' balance sheets be 
rearranged overnight could be unwise. 
Another Insurance Objective: 
Preventing Bank Runs 
For many who favor government-provided insurance for 
bank creditors, the purpose in having such insurance is to 
keep us from ever again experiencing a bank run. Nor is 
the concern that, with a run, the naive poor may suffer. 
They may. Whatever its implications for the distribution 
of wealth, though, any bank run is economically wasteful 
or costly. Allegedly, a loss of output results. That is why, 
in the view of some, another run is to be avoided and 
why, although provided by the government, insurance 
for bank creditors is desirable. 
Such insurance may not in general be necessary. 
Right or wrong, it is part of an academic orthodoxy that a 
central bank can prevent bank runs. As the argument 
goes, however, our central bank, the Federal Reserve 
System, failed us miserably in the early 1930s and even 
now, 50 years later, is still not to be trusted. That is, to 
say the least, arguable. But to a significant number of our 
academics, government-provided insurance of U.S. bank 
deposits appears necessary. 
How Serious Is the Threat? 
Among the benighted, a bank run is invariably portrayed 
as the doing of a frenzied mob, and we must be skeptical 
of any happening alleged to result from a great many 
individuals behaving in a silly way. But a bank run may 
also be the doing of (in the economist's sense) rational 
individuals. Think of some folks who have just gotten 
word of the failure of a bank. If not perfectly informed 
about the balance sheets of their banks, they may rea-
sonably revise their estimates of their risks and, depend-
ing on the costs, turn into currency whatever they have 
due them on demand. Doing that could be the best 
strategy. 
Concern about bank runs cannot therefore be dis-
missed with a wave of the hand, nor regarded as pure 
fancy. If a bank run can occur in a laissez-faire economy 
populated exclusively by rational, but not perfectly 
informed, individuals, then the possibility of one occur-
ring has to be taken seriously. 
Some may insist that our history is conclusive. Since 
the United States has experienced so many bank runs, 
how can there be no danger of another? Great care is 
required, though, in arguing from the past. It delights in 
tricking us. 
For a long time, the disposition, at least among 
academics who thought a bank run an ever-present 
possibility, was simply to accept that any widespread run 
would be economically costly. What, after all, could be 
intuitively more obvious? Recently, however, there has 
been some research done that makes it clearer than it was 
why with a run there may be a decrease in economic 
well-being.
2 We should then be concerned that a run may 
occur. Again, if there can be a run in an economy 
2It is not easy going, but see Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig, 
"Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy 
91 (June 1983): 401-19. 
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populated by rational, but imperfectly informed, indi-
viduals, then that one will occur cannot reasonably be 
regarded as a zero-probability event. And we should take 
seriously, a little more seriously than formerly, what 
many have long accepted as intuitively obvious, that 
bank runs are economically costly. 
Another Inconsistency 
For a bank run to be a happening of virtually zero 
probability, all bank creditors must be fully insured. All 
deposits, the largest included, must be fully protected. 
Should they be, then there is no appreciable risk of even a 
silent run, a run conducted by owners of large-denomina-
tion CDs. (Owners of such CDs do not go clamoring into 
bank lobbies demanding their funds.) So again, the 
$100,000 insurance limit appears as a curiosity. If the 
purpose of deposit insurance is to protect the naive poor, 
then, as was argued above, that limit is excessive. If, on 
the other hand, the purpose is to protect against bank 
runs, noisy and silent, then no dollar limit, be it $ 100,000 
or $200,000, is appropriate. 
There is always danger in being too literal minded 
and, in the present instance, of being guided entirely by 
what the FDIA says. Until recently, all depositors were, 
with probability very near to unity, fully insured. When a 
bank failed—a bank, that is, with more than a few 
creditors not (nominally) insured in full—then, if possi-
ble, it was merged into an ongoing bank. To merge was 
FDIC policy. The liabilities of the failed bank became 
the liabilities of the ongoing bank, and those with 
deposits of more than $100,000 in the failed bank 
emerged whole. 
The policy of the FDIC may still be to make sure that, 
whenever possible, no owner of large-denomination 
CDs loses anything. In the aftermath of the Penn Square 
Bank failure, however, one has to wonder. The FDIC 
may already have broken with the past. The official 
explanation is that Penn Square Bank creditors had to be 
paid off. The failed bank could not be merged into an 
ongoing one. It seems that the FDIC can tolerate only so 
much (contingent) risk! But the failure of the Penn 
Square Bank may have been a wonderful opportunity. 
The FDIC could put owners of large-denomination CDs 
on notice that they were at risk but, because the Penn 
Square Bank had been so wondrously mismanaged, 
without panicking them. 
That the failure of the Penn Square Bank was seen by 
the FDIC as an opportunity is a little more plausible now 
than it was. Not long ago, in a report prepared for the 
Congress (Deposit Insurance in a Changing Environ-
ment), the FDIC came out for putting owners of large 
deposits, those in excess of $ 100,000, at risk.
3 There are, 
of course, many ways in which that might be done. The 
statutory insurance limit might be taken seriously. The 
FDIC appears, however, to favor having owners of large 
deposits in banks that have failed share equally with it 
whatever losses there have been.
4 The rationale is the 
obvious one. With deregulation or less regulation by 
government agencies, private market participants will 
have to do more than they have been to keep banks from 
becoming too risky; and if some of those participants are 
at substantial risk, they will. 
In its report, the FDIC also recommended less 
secrecy about how banks—not as a group, but individu-
ally—are doing. So it wants private market participants 
to be concerned about how this bank and that are doing. 
And it would provide them with much of the information 
required for informed judgments. 
As was observed above, all bank creditors have to be 
fully insured if a bank run is to be an event of virtually 
zero probability. Nor can owners of large deposits be left 
to infer from what FDIC policy has been that they are (or 
may be) so insured. Full protection for all bank creditors 
should be guaranteed by statute. Netting of loans against 
deposits should be prohibited by statue.
5 It follows that if 
the FDIC's alternative to the present-day insurance 
3Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Deposit Insurance in a Chang-
ing Environment: A Study of the Current System of Deposit Insurance 
pursuant to Section 712 of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 
1982, Submitted to the United States Congress by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (Washington, D.C.: Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration, April 15, 1983). 
^Exactly what the FDIC has in mind is perhaps best revealed by an 
example. Imagine that an insured bank has failed and, further, that the FDIC has 
estimated that in the end, when the bank's affairs have at long last been all 
settled, its portfolio will turn out to have been worth 75 percent of book value. 
Imagine now that there is someone who had $200,000 on deposit in the failed 
bank. When it has been merged, that individual will have a deposit in the ongoing 
bank not of $200,000 but, rather, of only $175,000 ($100,000 plus 75 percent 
of the second $100,000 or, more generally, of whatever amount there was on 
deposit beyond the first $100,000). The individual will eventually get some of 
the lost $25,000 back if the FDIC's estimate of 75 percent is shown to have been 
too low. Or the FDIC may find itself having lost more than 25 percent of its share 
of the assets of the failed bank. It will if its estimate is shown to have been too 
high. 
5 Netting is easily explained. Imagine an owner of a small business who had 
$ 100,000 on deposit in a bank that has just failed and also a loan of $50,000 from 
that bank due, say, in 90 days. There is the possibility of that individual being 
pressured to settle for $50,000, the net of the deposit and the loan. Most would 
regard it as more reasonable, though, for the FDIC to do as it has been doing 
(except when very poor credit risks are involved)—to pay the $100,000 
immediately and, expecting payment in 90 days, take the note as its own. 
5 scheme is adopted, we will be living again with the risk of 
a bank run. To its credit, the FDIC does not deny that. It 
believes, though, that if its alternative is adopted, there 
will be only an inconsequential risk. But that is a 
judgment and, if with no great confidence, can reason-
ably be disputed. Someone might judge that there will be 
a very substantial risk of a bank run if the FDIC's 
alternative is adopted. Certainly, owners of large de-
posits will be at very substantial risk. 
The present-day insurance scheme (to be more exact, 
the scheme of the period before the failure of the Penn 
Square Bank) is inconsistent with further deregulation of 
baulking and a crisis-free future. Under it, insurance 
coverage is, with probability only a little less than unity, 
de facto a 100 percent. But is it necessary to accept risk 
of a bank run to make further deregulation safe? There 
are alternatives to the present-day scheme, more radical 
than that proposed by the FDIC in its recent report, that 
have to be considered. 
A Risk-Dependent Insurance Premium 
Since the FDIC first opened its doors, insured banks 
have all paid identical deposit insurance premiums. 
They may not go on doing so, though, if the FDIC has its 
way. In Deposit Insurance in a Changing Environment, 
it recommended that the insurance premium be made to 
depend, if only slightly, on its perception of bank risk (the 
quality of bank management). According to the FDIC, 
very poorly managed insured banks should in fairness 
pay the gross insurance premium; all other insured 
banks, all more or less well managed, should continue to 
pay the net premium.
6 Some, a few academic economists 
included, will applaud the FDIC. But most academics 
interested in deposit insurance will insist that it should 
have gone much further. For a long time now, the 
majority have advocated a genuinely risk-dependent 
insurance premium (which, being risk dependent, must 
be variable across banks). As has been argued so often, 
insured banks should be charged for insurance protection 
according to the riskiness of their respective balance 
sheets; and actual premium differentials should be 
whatever they have to be. 
My concern is that we, economists and bank regula-
tors, may not at present know enough to fashion an 
insurance premium schedule that might with consider-
able confidence be substituted for all present-day bank-
ing laws and administrative regulations. And "substi-
tuted" is the right word. At least among advocates of the 
risk-dependent premium, the assumption has always 
been that it will replace laws and regulations. We will 
depend only on it to keep banks from becoming too risky. 
There are various kinds of bank risks. If risk depen-
dent, the insurance premium must therefore depend on 
many variables: among them, the riskiness of the loan 
portfolio; the difference, as best measured, between asset 
and liability maturities; and, to tick off but one more, the 
types of nonbanking activities being engaged in. But do 
we know how all the industries of the world economy 
rank as credit risks? Or, within any particular industry, 
how the companies rank? And what about interest rate 
risk? Is there a consensus on how it is to be measured? 
Those are not the only questions. Another is how the 
insurance premium should depend on, for example, 
interest rate risk. Doubtless, the premium should be 
increasing. Saying that, however, does not suffice. At 
what rate should the premium increase? That would 
seem to be more an empirical question than a theoretical 
one. In any event, we are wanting in both theoretical 
results and empirical knowledge. 
Nor is it evident how the FDIC should proceed in 
levying penalty insurance premiums or what its modus 
operandi should be. Suppose bank A has a loan portfolio 
that, as judged by FDIC examiners, is riskier than the 
loan portfolio of bank B. We thus have bank A paying a 
greater insurance premium than bank B. And suppose 
now that with the passage of time, bank A comes to have 
relatively more nonperforming loans than bank B. With 
that having been revealed, should bank A be charged still 
more for its FDIC insurance? The answer to that 
question might seem to be an easy "no." That larger 
proportion of nonperforming loans was to have been 
expected, and in the beginning, bank A, having been 
judged to hold the riskier portfolio, was charged accord-
ingly. 
Recall, though, how many casualty insurance com-
panies, as insurers of automobile drivers, operate. We 
can start with two males, one a callow twenty and the 
other a mature fifty, paying different premiums. But if, 
for instance, the twenty year old has an accident, his 
6The gross and net insurance premiums differ by what can be thought of as a 
dividend. Currently, all insured banks begin by paying the gross premium. It and 
the eligible stock of deposits determine the FDIC's total revenue. From that 
total, it subtracts its operating expenses and losses and, possibly, some amount 
of dollars to be added to its reserve. Anything leftover is returned, in proportion 
to their original payments, to the banks. So when there is something leftover, 
gross and net insurance premiums differ. 
6 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Spring 1983 
premium is increased, at least relative to that of the fifty 
year old. And why? Supposedly, males twenty-five and 
younger have more accidents per capita than do those 
who are older. Yet, even as the insurer regards them, they 
(those twenty-five and younger) are a heterogeneous lot; 
and as we must presume, the company's operating as-
sumption is that auto accidents reveal who in that 
population class are the good and bad drivers. 
Again, then, should the FDIC simply disregard that 
observed relative increase in bank A's nonperforming 
loans? Having reminded ourselves of how auto insurers 
operate, a "yes" answer is less plausible than it appeared 
to be. What if the FDIC has nothing like complete 
information about its world? That relative increase in 
nonperforming loans may tell it something, possibly even 
about the quality of bank A's management. We might 
even imagine the FDIC starting off with identical pre-
miums for banks A and B. (Understandably, it may not 
be willing to put unbounded trust in the judgments of its 
examiners.) Then, once having observed a relative 
increase in the nonperforming loans of bank A, it 
increases that bank's insurance premium. 
Operating in the way just described could conceivably 
be sensible for the FDIC. But who is sure? We have to 
think more about what it is that we know and, admitting 
of the possibility of less-than-complete information, 
about what the modus operandi of the FDIC ought to be. 
Of course, I could be dead wrong. Determining that 
modus operandi may be remarkably easy; there might 
even now be someone out there in the weeds who knows 
what it should be. If I am right, though, a risk-dependent 
insurance premium is not at present a truly feasible 
option for the Congress. Nor will it do itself a favor by 
pretending. If it insists on further deregulation of banks, it 
will have to consider alternatives to our present-day 
insurance scheme even more radical than that of a risk-
dependent premium (with full insurance for all bank 
creditors). 
Other Radical Alternatives 
The most obvious of the even more radical alternatives is 
simply abolishing the FDIC. Letting banks and their 
creditors get along without any government-provided 
insurance is patently feasible. And were the Congress to 
abolish the FDIC, then, of course, there would be no 
risk-inducing insurance scheme barring the way to 
further deregulation of banks. But we cannot forget about 
wanting no more bank runs, and with no government-
provided insurance for bank creditors nor any laws or 
administrative regulations constraining banks, we could 
be particularly susceptible.
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Why Be First at the Teller Window? 
It is an oft-told tale that present-day British and hence 
U.S. bankers are descended from gold and silversmiths 
of a distant past. But they cannot be descended from the 
first generation of such smiths. The members of that 
generation were not really engaged in banking but rather, 
as the tale goes, only in keeping valuables safe. So their 
promises must have been of an obvious sort. Having 
handed over precious silver candelabra for safekeeping, 
one expects to get them back. And perhaps that is why a 
later generation of smiths, the first to be engaged in 
banking, issued promises for fixed amounts of specie. A 
patron handed over 10 coins and got a demand promise 
for 10 like coins. It is as if that later generation of smiths, 
although engaged in banking, could not forget their 
safekeeping forebears. 
I do not expect to be taken too seriously in my 
elaboration of the tale of banking's beginnings. But it is, I 
believe, true that from their beginnings our banks have 
issued bondlike or state-independent promises. Their 
promises have always been to pay back, regardless of the 
state of the world, fixed numbers of dollars. That has 
been little remarked on, and why is puzzling. Our 
banking industry has been prone to runs—or, to use the 
classical phrase, "inherently unstable"—because our 
banks have issued fixed-dollar claims and, at the same 
time, held risky assets. 
The issuing of fixed-dollar claims is not alone neces-
sary for a banking industry to be prone to runs. But, 
despite assertions to the contrary, neither are fractional 
reserves. For a banking industry to be prone to runs, 
banks must have fixed-dollar claims and, if demand 
7There is, however, a possibility that may lessen fears—a possibility 
suggested by the debate of the years before the FDIA was signed into law. In that 
debate, many of the largest of the then-existing banks were joined in opposition 
to having any bank liabilities insured by the government. Ranked against them 
were the much smaller but ever so much more numerous independent banks. 
Some, it seems, knew what was necessary for their survival, and that they (the 
least efficient) are still around could well be due more to the creation of the 
FDIC than to antibranching laws. If the introduction of deposit insurance is the 
essential explanation, and the Congress did away with the FDIC, then, for better 
or worse, our banking industry might undergo a dramatic reorganization and 
come to approximate much better than currently the very concentrated banking 
industries of other highly industrialized countries. There may, of course, be 
political objections. But if it is right that our country has experienced many more 
bank runs, local and countrywide, than have those other countries, that is a 
decidedly interesting possibility, one that should be taken seriously. Too often 
we assume a fixity that is entirely fanciful. 
7 claims, assets other than currency.
8 Why is readily 
explained. If banks issued equitylike claims (those of the 
sort issued by mutual funds) or had riskless portfolios, 
no demand creditor would ever see an advantage in being 
first at the teller window. To put the point another way, 
with banks issuing bondlike or fixed-dollar claims and 
having risky portfolios, being first at the teller window 
may be advantageous. Under certain circumstances, the 
creditor who is first will get what was promised but more 
therefore than a fair share, more than some of those 
farther back will get. 
Thus, there are ways, other than by introducing 
government-provided deposit insurance, of freeing a 
banking industry from the threat of a run. For instance, 
banks might be made to hold riskless portfolios. There 
may, however, be a practical difficulty. Telling banks to 
hold riskless portfolios would be easy enough, but 
ensuring compliance could in actual practice be extreme-
ly difficult and hence costly. It is a decided complication 
that what a riskless portfolio is depends on the composi-
tion of liabilities. 
Ensuring compliance could be made a trivial task. It 
would be if, independent of their respective liabilities, all 
banks were required to, in effect, hold only currency 
(freely convertible balances at the Federal Reserve). But 
the simplicity of a 100 percent reserve requirement is not 
as apparent now as it was 25 or 30 years ago. Bank 
liabilities are ever so much more diverse than they were. 
If there was ever any sense in defining a money supply, 
doing so has become an exercise in arbitrariness. 
The other way of freeing a banking industry from the 
threat of a run is by requiring banks to value their assets 
at market prices, or to mark them to market, and not once 
or twice a year but more or less continuously. If required 
to do that, they would not be able to offer fixed-dollar 
promises. Offering such promises would virtually assure 
their bankruptcy.
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There is a difficulty, though, one that is too serious to 
be glossed over. We still do not have a secondary market 
in bank loans. And since at present there is such a one-
sidedness in knowledge about any particular loan, a 
secondary market may be a long time in developing. So 
what is the market price of this or that loan? 
We might think of leaving it to banks to decide the 
values of the loans they have made. There are ways of 
assuring honest appraisals. One way is to let the 
government, by its choice, be either a buyer or a seller at 
the appraisal price. The bank that quotes an unrealisti-
cally low price will see what it has disappear; it will suffer 
a capital loss. The bank that quotes an unrealistically 
high price will too, for it will get more of what it fibbed 
about. For a bank, though, the only temptation is to 
overvalue its loans. To keep banks honest would there-
fore require being able to sell them more loans. And 
where is the government's stock of loans? Even if it had 
one, there would still be the difficulty, mentioned above, 
that assessing bank loans, unlike bankers' acceptances, 
is time-consuming—which is to say, costly. 
What would seem to be needed, then, to make 
marking to market a workable way of eliminating the 
threat of a bank run is a rule, reasonably acceptable to all, 
for valuing loans. As a practical matter, however, finding 
such a rule could prove as troublesome as finding an 
appropriate FDIC insurance premium schedule. But 
both the comptroller of the currency and the chair of the 




 So the staff of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency or that of the FDIC may 
one day produce a rule. 
In Summary 
I end as I began, by pointing a finger at the Congress. It 
has done what my farming uncle never even tried to do, 
put the cart before the horse. Although having managed 
some deregulation of banks, it has not yet gotten down to 
modifying the FDIA or, more particularly, making it 
consistent with deregulation. 
As I have argued, though, the Congress is in a tight 
spot. It can invite a wave of bank failures. All it has to do 
is deregulate further but without amending the FDIA in 
some appropriate way. Or it can do nothing more than 
decrease the insurance limit from the present $100,000 
8lt may seem that something more is required—namely, that banks must 
follow the rule of "first come-first serve" in dealings with creditors. And, in-
deed, they must. But they are bound to do so. Until a bank has sold off all its 
assets or, in anticipation of demise, suspended convertibility, it has no 
alternative. It cannot tell a creditor with, say, a demand claim to wait until it has 
rounded up all of his or her fellows. 
9lt might be argued that if required to value their assets at market prices, 
banks would continue making fixed-dollar promises but hold asset portfolios 
very different from those they currently hold. Of all conceivable asset portfolios, 
however, there is only one that literally does not ever change in value as interest 
rates change. And that portfolio, all cash, yields no interest income. A portfolio 
of instantly callable loans, made to individuals and companies, has default risk. 
Banks could hold just extremely short-term assets with no default risk. If they 
did, there would presumably be relatively little chance of a bank run, and 
requiring that assets be valued at market prices would have to be regarded as 
achieving the intended objective. 
10See Teresa Carson, "Historic Cost: A Thing of the Past?" American 
Banker (May 3, 1983): 10. 
8 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Spring 1983 
to, say, $2,000 or thereabouts. If it does that, it will 
perhaps have made insuring poor and unsophisticated 
bank creditors consistent with near-complete or possibly 
even complete deregulation. But it will also have made a 
bank run more likely. 
So the Congress is square up against having to do 
something radical (and possibly risky). It can insure all 
bank creditors in full. If it does, it will have reduced the 
probability of a bank run to near zero. But it will also 
have made the inconsistency between insuring bank 
creditors and the deregulation of banks even more glaring 
than it is now. It might then mandate a risk-dependent 
premium. The far from inconsiderable risk, however, is 
that the FDIC will not find an appropriate premium 
schedule and that, in consequence, the risk-dependent 
premium will substitute very poorly for present-day laws 
and regulations. 
The Congress does have one clean option. It can 
simply do away with government-provided insurance for 
bank creditors. The risk is the obvious one. We might be 
transported back into the nineteenth century. I think not, 
but there is no denying the possibility. 
There are finally two remaining alternatives, neither 
of which involves (in the usual sense of the word) any 
risk, only a disquieting element of arbitrariness. The 
Congress might require banks to hold riskless port-
folios—in the extreme, only currency. We may, how-
ever, be past that being a practical option. Who knows 
now what a bank is? Or what money is? Alternatively, 
the Congress might require banks to value their assets at 
market prices. Someone will have to work out a rule for 
valuing loans, but living with the arbitrariness, great or 
slight, of whatever rule is used could be the Congress' 
best hope. 
9 